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Abstract: Despite the wide acceptance of standard modal logic, there has
always been a temptation to think that ordinary modal discourse may
be correctly analyzed and adequately represented in terms of predicates
rather than in terms of operators. The aim of the formal model outlined
in this paper is to capture what I take to be the only plausible sense in
which ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ can be treated as predicates. The model
is built by enriching the language of standard modal logic with a quanti-
ficational apparatus that is “substitutional” rather than “objectual”, and
by obtaining from the language so enriched another language in which
constants for such predicates apply to singular terms that stand for pro-
positions.
I
The adjectives ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ are used both in common parlance
and in philosophical discourse. It seems essential to the way these adjectives
are used that they can occur beside clauses of the form ‘that so-and-so’, that
is, in constructions such as ‘it is possible (necessary) that so-and-so’ or ‘that
so-and-so is possible (necessary)’. The clauses of the form ‘that so-and-so’—
in short, that-clauses—are what grammarians call “nominalizations”. Prefacing
a declarative sentence with the word ‘that’, we create an expression that plays
the syntactic role characteristic of nouns. Take the sentence ‘that snow is white
is true’. The expression ‘that snow is white’ occurs in it in the subject position,
namely, in the same position occupied by ‘snow’ in the sentence ‘snow is white’.
Since that-clauses play the syntactic role characteristic of nouns, it is natural
to treat them as semantically analogous to nouns. This means that it is nat-
ural to treat them as having a reference. It is a widely held hypothesis that
propositions are the referents of that-clauses. According to this hypothesis,
‘that snow is white’ in the sentence above refers to the proposition that snow
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is white, and the adjective ‘true’ following it says something about that propos-
ition, namely, that it is true. ‘Possible’ and ‘necessary’, just as ‘true’, take nouns
and noun phrases as subjects. This grammatical fact encourages to think that
when we assertively utter a sentence containing ‘possible’ or ‘necessary’, we
refer to something and say of it that it is possible or necessary, that is, we pre-
dicate possibility or necessity of it. Therefore, it is quite natural to assume that
expressions such as ‘it is possible (necessary) that so-and-so’ or ‘that so-and-so
is possible (necessary)’ are used to describe certain things, propositions, as hav-
ing a certain property, possibility (necessity). On the basis of this assumption
one can easily account for inferences such as the following:
(1) whatever is necessary is possible
(2) it is necessary that every thing is identical to itself
(3) it is possible that every thing is identical to itself
It is quite natural to read (1) as having logical form ∀x(Fx → Gx). Accordingly,
it seems that in order for (3) to follow from (1) and (2), (2) must have logical
form Fa, that is, ‘necessary’ must be a predicate that applies to the referent of
the expression ‘that every thing is identical to itself ’. More generally, it is quite
natural to assume that the truth conditions of sentences in which ‘possible’
and ‘necessary’ occur beside that-clauses are analogous to those of sentences in
which ordinary predicates occur beside ordinary singular terms. A sentence of
logical form Fa is true just in case there is something to which a refers and this
something belongs to the extension of F, or has the property of being F. Thus,
‘snow is white’ is true just in case there is something to which ‘snow’ refers and
this something belongs to the extension of ‘white’, or has the property of being
white. Similarly, one may be apt to think that ‘it is possible that every thing is
identical to itself ’ is true just in case there is something to which ‘that every
thing is identical to itself ’ refers and this something belongs to the extension
of ‘possible’, or has the property of being possible.
Modal logic is intended to illuminate the notions of possibility and neces-
sity by providing a systematization of the logical relations between sentences
involving them. But if we open a book of modal logic we do not read that
‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ stand for properties of propositions. Rather, we find
that the notions of possibility and necessity can be accounted for in terms of
operators on formulas. The language of standard modal logic is obtained by
adding the operators ♦ (‘it is possible that’ or ‘possibly’) and  (‘it is necessary
that’ or ‘necessarily’) to the language of classical logic, in such a way that if α
is a formula of the language of classical logic, α and ♦α are formulas of the
language of standard modal logic. In other words, the syntactical treatment of
modality is analogous to that of negation. Just as ‘snow is not white’ is treated
as a sentence obtained by applying the operator ¬ (‘it is not the case that’) to
a given sentence (‘snow is white’), ‘it is possible that snow is white’ is treated
as a sentence obtained by applying the operator ♦ to the same sentence. So if
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one thinks that modal logic provides a satisfactory and exhaustive clarification
of the notions of possibility and necessity, one will be apt to talk of sentences
and modal operators rather than of propositions and modal predicates. If we
add to this that the notion of proposition is often regarded with distrust for
the metaphysical commitments that seems to require, it is easy to see how one
can come to the conclusion that the only acceptable modal talk is in terms of
sentences and modal operators. The inclination towards this conclusion may
be further reinforced by some limitative results that concern treatments of
modality in terms of metalinguistic predicates attempted in the past, notably,
the inconsistency results proved by Richard Montague1. On the basis of those
results, one may be apt to think that modal talk in terms of predicates is not
only unjustified but also inconsistent.
Thus, two divergent lines of thought seem practicable. On the one hand,
one may follow the grammatical appearance of expressions such as ‘that so-and-
so is possible (necessary)’, and take ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ to be predicates
that stand for properties of propositions. This amounts to saying that ‘that
so-and-so is possible (necessary)’ is to be regarded as semantically analogous to
‘snow is white’. Clear examples of this line of thought are provided by Gilbert
Harman, George Bealer and Stephen Schiffer.2 On the other hand, one may
think that modal logic takes care of the notions of necessity and possibility, and
nothing else need be assumed. Consequently, one may regard the grammar of
expressions such as ‘that so-and-so is possible (necessary)’ as simply misleading:
although it may seem that ‘that so-and-so is possible (necessary)’ breaks into
‘that so-and-so’ and ‘is possible (necessary)’, i. e., has logical form Fa, in reality it
is to be treated as breaking into ‘it is possible (necessary) that’ and ‘so-and-so’,
i. e. its logical form is analogous to that of a negated sentence.3 I believe that
neither of these lines of thought is fully satisfactory, although there is a grain
of truth in both of them. The aim of what follows is to explain why. Section 2
outlines what I take to be the plausible sense in which ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’
can be said to apply to propositions. Sections 3 and 4 present a formal model
that is intended to capture that sense. Section 5 shows how inferences such
as that from (1) and (2) to (3) can be accounted for within the model. Lastly,
section 6 deals with some philosophical implications of what is said in the
previous sections.
II
There is no widespread agreement among philosophers about what exactly pro-
positions are. But one thing that seems certain about them is that they are
truth bearers, namely, entities to which truth can be ascribed. The condition
at which a truth bearer is true is called its truth condition. For example, a
1See Montague 1963.
2See Harman 1972, p. 82, Bealer 1993, pp. 7–10, and Schiffer 2003, pp. 96–98.
3Here I don’t have in mind someone in particular, but I’m pretty sure that many logicians
would subscribe what has been just said.
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truth bearer that is true just in case snow is white is a truth bearer that has
snow being white as its truth condition. As snow is indeed white, such a truth
bearer is true in the world as it is now: its truth condition is satisfied by the
way things are. Truth bearers can also be evaluated with respect to states of af-
fairs different from the actual and present one. Instead of wondering whether
things as they are make a given truth bearer true, one may wonder whether
the way things were in the past (will be in the future), or the way things could
have been, would have been such as to make it true. That is, one may wonder
whether those circumstances would have been such as to satisfy its truth con-
dition. Just as for a truth bearer to be true in the present and actual state of
affairs is for its truth condition to be satisfied in the present and actual state
of affairs, for a truth bearer to be true in a state of affairs different from the
present and actual one is for its truth condition to be satisfied in that state of
affairs. This looks clear if we think of states of affairs as “possible worlds”. For
example, we can say that a truth bearer that has snow being white as its truth
condition is true in a certain possible world just in case snow is white in that
possible world.
Since propositions are truth bearers, the sense in which a proposition can
be said to be possible or necessary must be that in which a truth bearer can
be said to be possible or necessary. In accordance with the standard account
of modality, it seems correct to assume that the conditions at which ‘necessary’
and ‘possible’ apply to truth bearers are to be given in terms of a quantification
on possible worlds in which the truth bearers themselves are true. That is, a
truth bearer is necessary just in case it is true in all possible worlds, possible just
in case there is at least one possible world in which it is true. Therefore, the
obvious way of making sense of sentences like ‘(the proposition) that so-and-so
is necessary’ or ‘(the proposition) that so-and-so is possible’ is by taking them as
meaning ‘(the proposition) that so-and-so is true in all possible worlds’ or ‘there
is at least one possible world in which (the proposition) that so-and-so is true’.
In substance, if ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ are to be treated as predicates that
apply to propositions, the plausible way of making sense of the sentences in
which they occur beside that-clauses is in terms of a quantification on possible
worlds in which the propositions to which those that-clauses refer are true,
where the possible worlds in which they are true are the possible worlds in
which their truth conditions are satisfied.4
This amounts to saying that the plausible way of making sense of sentences
apparently involving ascription of possibility or necessity to propositions is
one according to which they turn out to be equivalent to sentences containing
modal operators attached to the sentences embedded in the that-clauses which
4To assume that ‘necessary’ is to be understood as ‘true in all possible worlds’ is not quite
the same thing as to assume that it means ‘logically true’. The issue of the connection between
necessity and logical truth is deliberately left out of the picture. Accordingly, no attempt will
be made to treat necessity in terms of provability in a system or of some other metalinguistic
notion, as for example does Priest 1976 and 1977.
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refer to those propositions. In terms of ordinary language, it amounts to saying
that ‘that p is possible’ is equivalent to ‘possibly, p’, and ‘that p is necessary’ is
equivalent to ‘necessarily, p’. Here I assume that the truth condition of the
proposition to which a that-clause refers is that of the sentence embedded
in the that-clause itself. This seems uncontroversial. For example, the truth
condition of the proposition to which the clause ‘that snow is white’ refers—
the proposition that snow is white—is that of the sentence ‘snow is white’,
i. e. both the proposition and the sentence are true just in case snow is white.
I also assume, as usual, that the truth condition of a sentence of the form ♦α
or α is to be given in terms of a quantification on possible worlds in which
α is true, where the possible worlds in which α is true are the possible worlds
in which its truth condition is satisfied. As a sentence containing a sentence
‘p’ prefixed by the adverb ‘possibly’ or ‘necessarily’ has logical form ♦α or α,
this means that its truth conditions depends on the satisfaction of the truth
condition of ‘p’ in the relevant possible worlds just as the truth condition of
a sentence in which ‘that p’ occurs beside ‘possible’ or ‘necessary’ depends on
the satisfaction of the truth condition of the proposition that p in the relevant
possible worlds.
III
Let L be a language of modal predicate logic. The vocabulary of L contains the
standard first-order connectives, variables, constants, and the modal operators
♦ and . The formation rules of L and the semantic interpretation of its for-
mulas are given in the usual way. Now let LM be a language obtained from L
as follows. The vocabulary of LM contains, in addition to the vocabulary of
L, the universal substitutional quantifier Π and an infinite supply of variables
p1, p2, p3 . . . called substitutional variables. The set of atomic formulas of LM
is specified as a set of expressions obtained by taking sentences of L and re-
placing zero or more sentences occurring in them with substitutional variables.
Note that this way all the sentences of L turn out to be atomic formulas of
LM. Arbitrary formulas of LM are defined inductively: an atomic formula is a
formula; if α is a formula, so are ¬α and Πpnα; if α and β are formulas, so is
α → β. Lastly, sentences of LM are defined as formulas of LM without free
(substitutional) variables.
The substitutional quantifier Π is formally similar to the standard or “ob-
jectual” quantifier ∀. However, its semantics is quite different. Variables also
play a different role. When we use the quantifier ∀ we presuppose a domain,
that is, a class of objects that we take to be our “universe of discourse”. ∀ is
then said to range over the domain, and the variables it binds are taken to refer
to the objects in it. On the contrary, Π does not range over a domain, and the
variables it binds do not refer to objects. What we presuppose in using Π is a
substitution class, that is, a class of linguistic expressions that can be substituted
for the variables it binds. A substitution instance of a sentence of the form Πpnα
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is a sentence obtained by replacing the variable pn occurring in α with an ex-
pression belonging to the substitution class. Πpnα is said to be true just in case
all its substitution instances are true. In our case the substitution class is that
of the sentences of L. Accordingly, a sentence of the form Πpnα turns out to
be true just in case all the sentences obtained by replacing pn with a sentence
of L are true. A complete specification of the truth conditions of the sentences
of LM may be given as follows. Let α be a sentence of LM. If α is an atomic
formula of LM, then α is true in LM iff it is true in L; ¬α is true in LM iff α is
not true in LM; α→ β is true in LM iff either α is not true in LM or β is true
in LM; Πpnα is true in LM iff all its substitution instances are true in LM. In
accordance with the assumption that the semantic interpretation of L is given
in the usual way, the notion of truth is to be understood in terms of truth in
a model. Note that formulas with free substitutional variables are assigned no
semantic interpretation. This contrasts with the objectual case, where open
formulas are normally interpreted in terms of satisfaction.5
Let LMp be a language obtained from LM in the following way. The vocab-
ulary of LMp contains, in addition to the vocabulary of LM, the singular term
forming operator [ ] (= ‘that’), and the predicates P (= ‘possible’) andN (= ‘ne-
cessary’). The set of atomic formulas of LMp is characterized as follows: every
atomic formula of LM is an atomic formula of LMp; if α is an atomic formula
of LMp, so are P[α] and N[α]; Pxn and Nxn are also atomic formulas of LM,
where xn is the nth objectual variable of LMp. Arbitrary formulas of LMp are
defined inductively: an atomic formula is a formula; if α is a formula, so are
¬α, ∀xnα and Πpnα ; if α and β are formulas, so is α→ β. Sentences of LMp
are defined as formulas of LMp without free variables (of any kind). It is easy
to see that every formula of LM turns out to be a formula of LMp. Conversely,
there are formulas of LMp that are not formulas of LM, namely, those contain-
ing symbols of the additional vocabulary of LMp. We call rich formulas of LMp
the formulas of the latter kind. Accordingly, we call rich sentences of LMp the
sentences of LMp that are rich formulas of LMp.
Let T be a relation on the set of formulas of LMp, that is, a set of ordered
pairs 〈α,α∗〉 such that both α and α∗ are formulas of LMp. For atomic formu-
las of LMp, T is defined as follows. If α a formula of LM, then
(a) α∗ = α
If α has the form P[β] or N[β], then
(b) α∗ = α(♦β/P[β],β/N[β])
where α(♦β/P[β],β/N[β]) is obtained from α by replacing P[β]with ♦β and
N[β] with β. If α has the form Pxn or Nxn, then
(c) α∗ = (α([pn]/xn))∗
5Here I follow Kripke 1976, pp. 354–355.
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where α([pn]/xn) is obtained from α by replacing the nth objectual variable
with the nth substitutional variable. The following clauses complete the defin-
ition of T :
(d) (¬α)∗ = ¬(α)∗
(e) (α→ β)∗ = (α)∗ → (β)∗
(f ) (Πpnα)∗ = Πpn(α)∗
(g) (∀xnα)∗ = (Πpnα)∗
The domain of T is the set of formulas of LMp, that is, every formula α of LMp
is such that 〈α,α∗〉 ∈ T for some α∗. This simply follows from the definition
of T in terms of (a)–(g). For given the formation rules of LMp, each formula of
LMp falls under one of the cases specified by (a)–(g). The range of T is a subset
of the set of formulas of LM, that is, if α∗ is a formula such that 〈α,α∗〉 ∈ T
for some α, then α∗ is a formula of LM. This can be shown by induction on
the complexity of the formulas of LMp, where the complexity of a formula
of LMp is defined as the number of connectives of LMp it contains. Let φ
be a formula of LMp. As a first step we assume that φ has complexity 0. In
this case φ is atomic. If φ is a formula of LM, then φ∗ is a formula of LM.
For by (a) φ∗ = φ. If φ is rich and has the form P[α] or N[α], then by (b)
φ∗ = φ(♦β/P[β],β/N[β]). As φ(♦β/P[β],β/N[β]) is obtained from φ by
replacing P[β]with ♦β andN[β]withβ, it is a formula of LM. Ifφ is rich and
has the form Pxn orNxn, then by (c)φ∗ = (φ([pn]/xn))∗. Asφ([pn]/xn) has
the form P[α] or N[α], φ∗ turns out to be a formula of LM for the reason seen
above. We proved that if φ has complexity 0 then φ∗ is a formula of LM. Now
we assume that the result holds for formulas of complexity n − 1, and that φ
has complexity n. Suppose that φ has the form ¬α. Then, by (d) φ∗ = ¬(α)∗.
As the complexity of φ is n, the complexity of α is n − 1. By hypothesis this
entails that α∗ is a formula of LM. But then ¬(α)∗ is a formula of LM as well.
Therefore, φ∗ is a formula of LM. The case in which φ has the form α → β
and that in whichφ has the formΠpnα are analogous. Lastly, the case in which
φ has the form ∀xnα reduces to the latter, as by (g) (∀xnα)∗ = (Πpnα)∗.
F 1 T is a function, in that for every formula α of LMp there is only one
formula α∗ of LM such that 〈α,α∗〉 ∈ T .
P We show that given any two formulas γ and δ of LM, if 〈φ,γ〉 ∈ T
and 〈φ, δ〉 ∈ T , then γ = δ. As a first step we assume that φ has complexity
0. In this case φ is atomic. If φ is a formula of LM, then by (a) γ = φ and
δ = φ. Therefore, γ = δ. If φ is rich and has the form P[α]orN[α], then by (b)
γ = φ(♦β/P[β],β/N[β]) and γ = φ(♦β/P[β],β/N[β]). Only one formula
can be obtained by replacing in φ, P[β] with ♦β andN[β] with β. Therefore,
γ = δ. If φ is rich and has the form Pxn or Nxn, then by (c) γ = φ([pn]/xn)
and δ = φ([pn]/xn). Only one formula can be obtained by replacing in φ the
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nth objectual variable with the nth substitutional variable. Therefore, γ = δ.
We proved that if φ has complexity 0 then γ = δ. Now we assume that the
result holds for formulas of complexity n − 1, and that φ has complexity n.
Suppose that φ has the form ¬α. Then, by (d) φ∗ = ¬(α)∗. This means that
γ = ¬(α)∗ and δ = ¬(α)∗. As the complexity of φ is n, the complexity of
α is n − 1. By hypothesis this entails that there is a unique formula α∗ such
that 〈α,α∗〉 ∈ T . Therefore, we get that γ = ¬α∗ and δ = ¬α∗, and hence
that γ = δ. The case in which φ has the form α → β and that in which φ has
the form Πpnα are analogous. Lastly, the case in which φ has the form ∀xnα
reduces to the latter, as by (g) γ = (Πpnα)∗ and δ = (Πpnα)∗. We proved
that for every formula φ of LMp there is a unique formula φ∗ of LM such that
〈φ,φ∗〉 ∈ T . As usual, the unique φ∗ is said to be the value T(φ) which T
assumes at φ, and T is said to map the set of sentences of LMp into the set of
sentences of LM. T may be defined as a translation function from formulas of
LMp to formulas of LM. ]
F 2 If φ is a sentence of LMp then T(φ) is a sentence of LM.
P As a first step we assume that φ is a sentence of complexity 0. In this
case φ is atomic. If φ is a formula of LM, then by (a) T(φ) = φ. Therefore,
T(φ) is a sentence of LM. If φ is rich and has the form P[α] or N[α], then it
contains a sentence γ of L prefixed by i occurrences of P and k occurrences
of N. By (b) T(φ) = φ(♦β/P[β],β/N[β]), where φ(♦β/P[β],β/N[β]) is
a formula containing γ prefixed by i occurrences of ♦ and k occurrences of .
As γ is a sentence of L, φ(♦β/P[β],β/N[β]) is a sentence of LM. Therefore,
T(φ) is a sentence of LM. Now we assume that the result holds for sentences
of complexity n − 1, and that φ is a sentence of complexity n. Suppose that
φ has the form ¬α. Then, by (d) T(φ) = ¬T(α). As the complexity of φ
is n, the complexity of α is n − 1. By hypothesis this entails that T(α) is a
sentence of LM. But if T(α) is a sentence of LM then also ¬T(α) is a sentence
of LM. Therefore, T(φ) is a sentence of LM. The case in which φ has the form
α → β is similar. Suppose now that φ has the form Πpnα. As the complexity
of φ is n, the complexity of α is n − 1, where α is a formula in which pn
occurs free. Therefore, given any sentence s of L, α(s/pn) turns out to be
a sentence of complexity n − 1. By hypothesis this entails that T(α(s/pn))
is a sentence of LM. It is easy to see that T(α)(s/pn) = T(α(s/pn)), and
hence that T(α)(s/pn) is a sentence of LM. But then T(α) is a formula of LM
in which pn occurs free. From this follows that ΠpnT(α) is a sentence of LM.
Since by (f ) T(Πpnα) = ΠpnT(α), we get that T(φ) is a sentence of LM. Lastly,
suppose that φ has the form ∀xnα. Then, by (g) T(φ) = Πpnα, which leads
us back to the previous case. ]
What has been said so far entails that there is a translation function from sen-
tences of LMp to sentences of LM. This can be seen as follows. We know
that T is a translation function from formulas of LMp to formulas of LM. T is
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defined as a set of ordered pairs, namely, the set of ordered pairs 〈α,α∗〉 such
that α is a formula of LMp and α∗ is the formula of LM which is the value
assumed by T at α. Let T ′ be the subset of T formed by all the ordered pairs
〈α,α∗〉 ∈ T such that α is a sentence of LMp. By the result just proved we get
that if 〈α,α∗〉 ∈ T ′ then α∗ is a sentence of LM. Therefore, T ′ is a function
that maps the set of sentences of LMp into the set of sentences of LM. In
other words, T ′ is a translation function from sentences of LMp to sentences
of LM.
Now we are in a position to fix the semantics of the sentences of LMp. As
a first thing, we stipulate that every sentence of LMp that is a sentence of LM
has in LMp the same semantic interpretation that it has in LM. Secondly, we
impose a general constraint on the semantic interpretation of the sentences of
LMp, namely, that the following condition is to be satisfied: for any sentence α
of LMp, α is true in a givenmodel if and only if T ′(α) is true in that model. This
way all the rich sentences of LMp turn out to be equivalent to sentences of LM
in accordance with the clauses (a)–(g). The clause (b) ensures that sentences
containing P or N are equivalent to sentences containing ♦ or  respectively.
Informally speaking, this amounts to the view that a sentence containing ‘pos-
sible’ or ‘necessary’ beside a that-clause is equivalent to a sentence containing
the corresponding modal adverb beside the sentence embedded in the that-
clause. According to (c) and (g), objectually quantified sentences containing P
or N besides “objectual” variables are equivalent to substitutionally quantified
sentences containing P or N besides terms embedding substitutional variables.
Informally speaking, the underlying assumption is that for every that-clause
there is a proposition to which it refers, and for every proposition there is a
that-clause that refers to it.6
IV
LetM be a set of sentences of LM. We say thatM is a theory whose language
is LM and that a sentence is a theorem of M just in case it belongs to M. For
the purposes at hand we may assume that M is a theory that includes first-
order predicate logic and modal propositional logic, say, a theory that includes
a system of first-order logic extended with the axioms characteristic of KT . In
this case Lmay be a language in which ♦ and do not occur in a formula unless
they prefix a sentence, i. e., they do not occur within the scope of a quantifier.
A set Γ of sentences of LM is said to be true in a given model just in case every
sentence in Γ is true in that model. Accordingly, M turns out to be true in a
given model just in case every theorem ofM is true in that model. A set Γ of
sentences of LM is said to entail a sentence φ of LM just in case there is no
model in which Γ is true but φ isn’t true. We assume that M is closed under
entailment. That is, if Γ is a subset ofM and Γ entails φ, then φ belongs toM
as well.
6Independent reasons for this assumption are provided in Iacona 2002.
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Now letΛ be any set of rich sentences of LMp such that for every sentence
α ∈ Λ, T ′(α) ∈ M. We call Mp the set of sentences of LMp obtained by
adding Λ to M, the result being closed under entailment. As in the case of
M, we say that Mp is a theory whose language is LMp, and that a sentence of
LMp is a theorem of Mp just in case it belongs to Mp. Accordingly, we say
that Mp is true in a given model just in case all its theorems are true in that
model. Closure under entailment is defined as inM. What has been said so far
aboutM andMp leaves indeterminate how they may be characterized in proof-
theoretic terms. Here it suffices to say that they may be regarded as axiomatic
systems whose theorems are the members ofM andMp respectively, and such
thatMp includes some set of transformation rules which turn out to be valid
on our assumptions about the semantic interpretation of the sentences of LMp.
However a complete characterization ofM andMp may be given, it turns out
that
F 3 Mp is equivalent toM
P To say that two theories are equivalent is to say that each of them is
true in a given model just in case the other is true in that model. First we prove
that ifMp is true in a given model thenM is true in that model. Suppose that
m is a model in whichMp is true. AsMp is obtained by addingΛ toM, bothΛ
andM are true inm. Therefore,M is true inm. Second, we prove that ifM is
true in a given model thenMp is true in that model. Suppose thatm is a model
in which M is true. Given our stipulations about the semantic interpretation
of the sentences of LMp, every sentence α ∈ Λ is true in a model iff T ′(α) is
true in it. As we assumed that T ′(α) ∈ M for every α ∈ Λ, we get that Λ is
true inm. Therefore,M+Λ is true inm. But ifM+Λ is true inm then every
sentence entailed byM+Λ is true inm. Therefore,Mp is true inm. ]
From the equivalence result we get that
F 4 Mp is a consistent extension ofM.
P It is easy to see that Mp is an extension of M. We say that a theory
is an extension of another theory if every theorem of the second theory is a
theorem of the first theory. AsMp is a set obtained by adding Λ toM, every
sentence in M belongs to Mp. By definition this means that every theorem
of M is a theorem of Mp. Now we prove that Mp is a consistent extension
of M. We say that a consistent extension of a given theory is an extension of
that theory such that the consistency of the latter entails the consistency of
the former. Let us assume thatM is consistent, i. e., that there is at least one
model in which it is true. Call m one such model. By the equivalence result
every model in whichM is true is a model in whichMp is true. Therefore,Mp
is true in m. This means that there is at least one model in whichMp is true,
and hence thatMp is consistent. ]
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V
The expressive power of LMp is rather limited. But it easy to see how the
formal machinery presented might be enriched by adding to the vocabulary of
LM (hence of LMp) the connectives ∧, ∨, ∃, and the existential substitutional
quantifier Σ. There seems to be no claim in our ordinary modal discourse
in terms of that-clauses that cannot appropriately be expressed within LMp
or some unproblematic extension of it. This suggests that a theory such as
Mp may be regarded as a basically adequate formal representation of that dis-
course. Accordingly, the additional linguistic resources that Mp has over M
may be taken to formally represent the apparent “additional content” that our
ordinary modal talk in terms of that-clauses has over the modal talk in terms
of sentential operators involved in modal logic. The additional linguistic re-
sources of Mp vindicate the intuitions on the basis of which one might be
apt to regard the latter as departing from ordinary modal discourse. Take the
inference considered at the beginning of the paper:
(1) whatever is necessary is possible
(2) it is necessary that every thing is identical to itself
(3) it is possible that every thing is identical to itself
We saw that it is natural to regard this inference as valid by assuming that (1)
has logical form ∀x(Fx → Gx), (2) has logical form Fa, and (3) has logical form
Ga. This is perfectly acceptable within a theory such asMp. First of all, LMp
enables us to represent (1), (2) and (3) as having the assumed logical form. The
following are sentences of LMp:
(1a) ∀xn(Nxn → Pxn)
(2a) N[∀xi(xi = xi)]
(3a) P[∀xi(xi = xi)]
The term [∀xi(xi = xi)] occurring in (2a) and (3a) is the formal counterpart
of the clause ‘that every thing is identical to itself ’. We saw that LMp allows
objectual quantification over such terms. In the second place, the validity of
the inference is preserved, in that (1a) and (2a) entail (3a). This can be shown
as follows. Since every sentence α of LMp is true in a model iff T ′(α) is true in
that model, (1a), (2a) and (3a) are true in a model iff
(1b) Πpn(pn → ♦pn)
(2b) ∀xi(xi = xi)
(3b) ♦∀xi(xi = xi)
are true in that model. That (1b) is the value that T ′ assumes at (1a) can be
seen as follows. By clause (g) T ′(∀xn(Nxn → Pxn)) = T ′(Πpn(Nxn →
Pxn)). By clause (f ) T ′(Πpn(Nxn → Pxn)) = ΠpnT ′(Nxn → Pxn). By
clause (e) ΠpnT ′(Nxn → Pxn) = ΠpnT ′(Nxn) → T ′(Pxn). By clause (c)
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ΠpnT
′(Nxn) → T ′(Pxn) = ΠpnT ′(N[pn]) → T ′(P[pn]). By clause (b)
ΠpnT
′(N[pn]) → T ′(P[pn]) = Πpn(pn → ♦pn). It is easy to see that
(2b) and (3b) are the values assumed by T ′ at (2a) and (3a) respectively. Now
suppose thatm is a model in which (1a) and (2a) are true. From the equivalence
just considered we get that (1b) and (2b) are true in m. But every model in
which (1b) and (2b) are true is a model in which (3b) is true. For (1b) entails
∀y(y = y) → ♦∀y(y = y) as one of its substitution instances, and from the
latter together with (2b) we get (3b). Therefore, (3b) is true in m. From this
plus the equivalence considered it follows that (3a) is true in m. We proved
that (1a) and (2a) entail (3a). As Mp is closed under entailment, we get that if
(1a) and (2a) are theorems ofMp then (3a) is a theorem of Mp. This amounts
to saying thatMp enables us to formally represent the inference (1)–(3) as valid.
At the same time, we saw that (1b) and (2b) entail (3b). AsM is closed under en-
tailment, we get that if (1b) and (2b) are theorems ofM then (3b) is a theorem
of M. This amounts to saying that the inference (1)–(3) may be appropriately
“translated” into LM and formally represented as valid withinM.
VI
The foregoing considerations suggest we may plausibly steer a middle path
between the two lines of thought outlined at the beginning of the paper. On
the one hand, there is a sense in which it is right to say that ‘possible’ and
‘necessary’ are predicates that apply to propositions. It is the sense in which
a language containing constants for such predicates and appropriate terms is
a perfectly legitimate representation of our ordinary modal talk in terms of
that-clauses. We saw that Mp turns out to be consistent on the assumption
that M is consistent. Accordingly, it would be wrong to think that the only
acceptable or legitimate modal language is that of modal operators. On the
other hand, there is a sense in which it is right to say that nothing but modal
logic is needed in order to account for our ordinary modal discourse. It is
the sense in which there seems to be no interesting inference in our ordinary
modal talk in terms of that-clauses that cannot be appropriately translated into
the language of modal logic. Given the equivalence between rich sentences of
LMp and sentences of LM warranted by T ′, it seems right to say thatMp is a
“purely linguistic” extension ofM, or thatMp adds nothing “substantive” toM.
It would be wrong to think that there is a substantive gap between our modal
intuitions and modal logic, or that the language of modal logic significantly
departs from our ordinary modal discourse.
What has been said so far leaves indeterminate whether or not it is right
to say that propositions exist, and that ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ stand for prop-
erties of propositions. There are different ways of accounting for the equival-
ence between sentences containing modal predicates and sentences containing
modal operators. One is to say that propositions and their modal properties
don’t really exist, but there is nothing wrong in speaking “as if ” they existed.
This is essentially what Hartry Field takes to be fictionalism about intensional
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entities.7 Another is to say that propositions and their modal properties are
abstract entities that exist as a result of our way of speaking. This is a form
of conceptualism that I find congenial.8 The gap that separates the two views
doesn’t seem to be very big, and presumably no important philosophical issue
turns on it. Rather, the significant divide is between the two views on the
one hand, and the view that propositions are mind-independent and language-
independent entities on the other, namely, Platonism. I take it that if one is
a Platonist about propositions and their properties, one has to provide some
non-trivial story according to which it cannot simply be assumed that for every
that-clause there is a proposition to which it refers, and for every proposition
there is a that-clause that refers to it. But this is just what happens with the
formal model outlined.
A metaphor that has been invoked to suggest what things like properties
or propositions turn out to be on a conceptualist construal is that of abstract
entities as “shadows” of linguistic expressions: properties would be shadows of
predicates, propositions would be shadows of sentences or that-clauses. The
idea behind the metaphor is that properties or propositions are not objects be-
longing to an external reality, like lemon trees. Rather, they are the result of a
projection, as it were, of our language and conceptual apparatus on the external
reality. What there is to say about them is not to be found by investigating the
external reality, as it happens with lemon trees, but can simply be extracted
from an analysis of our linguistic and conceptual apparatus. The contrast is
with Platonism, according to which properties or propositions are like lemon
trees, and what there is to say about them is to be discovered by investigat-
ing the external reality. Obviously, metaphors are just metaphors. But there
seems to be at least one respect in which propositions and their properties are
like shadows. There can be an interesting question whether shadows exist or
only the objects of which they are shadows exist. But independently of this
question, one thing that is certain about shadows is that if they exist, their
existence depends on that of the objects of which they are shadows. Similarly,
there can be an interesting question whether propositions and their properties
exist or only linguistic entities like that-clauses and predicates exist. But in-
dependently of this question, one thing that is certain about propositions and
their properties as they have been characterized so far is that if they exist, their
existence depends on that of our linguistic and conceptual apparatus.9
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